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ABSTRACT 
The systems engineering process is well established and well understood. While 
this statement could be argued in the light of the many systems engineering 
guidelines and that have been developed, comparative review of these 
respective descriptions reveal that they differ primarily in the number of discrete 
steps or other nuances, and are at their core essentially common. Likewise, the 
systems engineering textbooks differ primarily in the context for application of 
systems engineering or in the utilization of evolved tools and techniques, not in 
the basic method. Thus, failures in systems engineering cannot credibly be 
attributed to implementation of the wrong systems engineering process among 
alternatives. However, numerous systems failures can be attributed to deficient 
implementation of the systems engineering process. What may clearly be 
perceived as a system engineering deficiency in retrospect can appear to be a 
well considered system engineering efficiency in real time - an efficiency taken to 
reduce cost or meet a schedule, or more often both. Typically these efficiencies 
are grounded on apparently solid rationale, such as reuse of heritage hardware 
or software. Over time, unintended consequences of a systems engineering 
process deficiency may begin to be realized, and unfortunately often the 
consequence is system failure. This paper describes several actual cases of 
system failures that resulted from deficiencies in their systems engineering 
process implementation, including the Ariane 5 and the Hubble Space 
Telescope. 
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The development of space systems, including launch vehicles and spacecraft, is 
a risky undertaking. The systems tend to be complex, and design margins tend 
to be very thin, such that the systems tend not to fail gracefully - that is, when 
failures occur, the consequences tend to be catastrophic and spectacular. The 
discussion which follows will examine seven catastrophic, spectacular system 
failures and how systems engineering process deficiencies contributed to those 
failures. Section 2 will describe a systems engineering proc model against 
which the relevant contributing factors to the system failure will be categorized. 
Section 3 will briefly examine the failures of seven space systems - one launch 
vehicle and six spacecraft - and identify contributing systems engineering 
process deficiencies. An analysis of these systems engineering process 
deficiencies is presented in Section 4, and closing remarks are given in Section 
5. A list of references, including the failure reports for each of the seven 
systems, is included in Section 6. 
2. Systems Engineering Process Model 
A system engineering process model is needed to provide a framework for 
characterization of systems engineering process deficiencies as causal 
contributors to systems failures. Rather than offer an original system engineering 
process model, one will be chosen from an existing system engineering 
standard. Numerous systems engineering standards have been developed that 
describe many models of the systems engineering process, and many definitions 
of systems engineering are provided. Comparative assessment of these 
standards reveals much more commonality than distinction. For instance, a 
comparison of two of the more noteworthy standards, IEEE-1220 /E€€ Standard 
for Application and Management of the Systems Engineering Process and 
ISOIIEC 15288 Systems engineering - System life cycle processes is given in 
Annex C of IEEE-1220. [4] This comparative assessment provides a cross- 
reference between the two standards’ differing terminologies and process 
hierarchies that illustrates their fundamental equivalence. One distinction 
between the standards is the more comprehensive life cycle model of ISOIIEC 
15288; whereas IEEE-1220 focuses on system development and operations, 
ISOIIEC 15288 includes the concept and retirement portions in the life cycle 
model. Although any of the popular systems engineering standards would be 
satisfactory for purposes of this paper, ISOIIEC 15288 will be used since it is the 
lone international standard. 
ISOIIED 15288 Systems engineering - System life cycle processes establishes 
a common framework for describing the life cycle of systems including concept, 
development, production, utilization, support, and retirement as depicted in 
Figure 1. [2] ISOIIEC 15288 consists of 25 distinct processes grouped into four 
general categories: Agreement Processes, Enterprise Processes, Project 
Processes, and Technical Processes. The Agreement Processes are business 
centric processes, and not directly relevant to the analyses performed for this 
paper. Likewise, Enterprise Processes are strategic in nature and involve 
multiple projects, and hence also not relevant to a discussion of specific project 
failures. Still, it should be noted that the conclusions drawn from this analysis are 
indeed relevant to the Enterprise Processes of a national space agency or 
corporate supplier of space systems. 
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Figure 1. System Life Cycle (ref. Figure D-I in ISO/IEC 15288) 
The Project Processes are used to establish and evolve project plans, to assess 
actual achievement and progress against the plans and to control execution of 
the project through to fulfillment. The Project Processes consist of the following 
individual processes: 
a) Project Planning Process -- produce and communicate effective and 
workable project plans; 
b) Project Assessment Process -- determine the status of the project; 
c) Project Control Process -- direct project plan execution and ensure that 
the project performs according to plans and schedules, within 
projected budgets and it satisfies technical objectives; 
d) Decision-making Process -- select the most beneficial course of project 
action where alternatives exist; 
anagement Process -- reduce the effects of uncertain events that 
may result in changes to quality, cost, schedule or technical 
characteristics; 
f) Configuration Management Process -- establish and maintain the 
integrity of all identified outputs of a project or process and make them 
available to concerned parties; 
g) Information Management Process -- provide relevant, timely, complete, 
valid and, if required, confidential information to designated parties 
during and, as appropriate, after the system life cycle. 
The Technical Processes are used to define the requirements for a system, to 
transform the requirements into an effective product, to permit consistent 
reproduction of the product where necessary, to use the product to provide 
required services, to sustain the provision of those services and to dispose of the 
product when it is retired from service. The Technical Processes consist of the 
following processes: 
a) Stakeholder Requirements Definition Process -- define the 
requirements for a system that can provide the services needed by 
users and other stakeholders in a defined environment; 
b) Requirements Analysis Process -- transform the stakeholder, 
requirement-driven view of desired services into a technical view of a 
required product that could deliver those services; 
c) Architectural Design Process -- synthesize a solution that satisfies 
system requirements; 
d) Implementation Process -- produce a specified system element; 
e) Integration Process -- assemble a system that is consistent with the 
architectural design; 
9 Verification Process -- confirm that the specified design requirements 
are fulfilled by the system; 
g) Transition Process -- establish a capability to provide services specified 
by stakeholder requirements in the operational environment; 
h) Validation Process -- provide objective evidence that the services 
provided by a system when in use comply with stakeholders’ 
requirements; 
i) Operation Process -- use the system in order to deliver its services; 
rocess -- sustain the capability of the system to provide a 
se wi ce ; 
k) Disposal Process -- end the existence of a system entity. 
Figure 2 depicts the foregoing Project and Technical processes that provide the 
benchmark systems engineering process model which the system failures in the 
following section will be assessed. 
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Figure 2. Systems hgineering Process Model (adapted from Figure C.1 in 
ISO/I€C 15288) 
3. An Overview of Selected System Failures 
The discussion which follows will describe the failures of various space systems 
from launch vehicles to scientific spacecraft. The failure scenario will be 
described, a summary of the cause of the failure, and then the failure cause will 
be put in the context of deficiencies of one or more of the system engineering 
processes as described in the foregoing section. In all cases, the associated 
failure reports are used as sources for the failure scenario and the failure 
cause(s). In general, the contributing factors to the failure cause are drawn from 
the failure reports, although the classification of those contributing factors within 
a systems engineering process schema is not addressed in the failure reports. 
Finally, the treatment of the systems failures is not intended to be exhaustive, 
and only those elements of the failure reports most relevant to systems 
engineering are included. The reader is referred to the failure reports given in 
the Reference listing, which are all in the public domain, for a comprehensive 
treatment of the respective system failures. 
3.1 Ariane 5 
3.1 .I System Failure Scenario 
On 4 June 1996, the maiden flight of the Ariane 5 launcher ended in a failure. 
Only about 40 seconds after initiation of the flight sequence, at an altitude of 
about 3700 meters, the launcher veered off its flight path, broke up and 
exploded. 
3.1.2 Failure Cause 
The origin of the failure was flight control system, and more particularly the 
Inertial Reference Systems, with the primary and backup ceasing to function 
almost simultaneously at around HO + 36.7 seconds. This loss of guidance and 
attitude information was due to specification and design errors in the software of 
the inertial reference system. 
The inertial reference system of Ariane 5 was essentially common to a system 
which was flying on the version of Ariane 4 in operation at that time. The part of 
the software which caused the interruption in the inertial system computers was 
used before launch to align the inertial reference system and, in Ariane 4, also to 
enable a rapid realignment of the system in case of a late hold in the countdown. 
This realignment function served no purpose on Ariane 5, but was nevertheless 
retained for commonality reasons and allowed, as in Ariane 4, to operate for 
approx. 40 seconds after lift-off. During design of the software of the inertial 
reference system used for Ariane 4 and Ariane 5, a decision was made that it 
was not necessary to protect the inertial system computer from being made 
inoperative by an excessive value of the variable related to the horizontal 
velocity, although this protection was provided for several other variables of the 
alignment software. Ariane 5 had a high initial acceleration and a trajectory 
which led to a build-up of horizontal velocity which was five times more rapid than 
for Ariane 4. The higher horizontal velocity of Ariane 5 generated, within the 40- 
second timeframe, the excessive value which caused the inertial system 
computers to cease operation. [3] 
3.1.3 Systems Engineering Process Deficiencies 
-- The purpose of the review process, which involved all 
major partners in the Ariane 5 program, was to validate design decisions and to 
obtain flight qualification. In this process, the limitations of the alignment 
software were not fully analyzed and the possible implications of allowing it to 
continue to function during flight were not realized. 
Architecture Design -- The specification of the inertial reference system and the 
tests performed at equipment level did not specifically include the Ariane 5 
trajectory data. Consequently the realignment function was not tested under 
simulated Ariane 5 flight conditions, and the design error was not discovered. 
Verification -- It would have been technically feasible to include almost the entire 
inertial reference system in the overall system simulations which were performed. 
For a number of reasons it was decided to use the simulated output of the inertial 
reference system, not the system itself or its detailed simulation. Had the system 
been included, the failure could have been detected. Post-flight simulations have 
been carried out on a computer with software of the inertial reference system and 
with a simulated environment, including the actual trajectory data from the Ariane 
501 flight. These simulations have faithfully reproduced the chain of events 
leading to the failure of the inertial reference systems. 
3.2 Hubble Space Telescope 
3.2.1 System Failure Scenario 
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) was launched aboard the Space Shuttle 
Discovery on 24 April 1990. During checkout on orbit, it was discovered that the 
telescope could not be properly focused because of a flaw in the optics. Both of 
the high resolution imaging cameras (the Wide Field/Planetary Camera and the 
Faint Object Camera) showed the same characteristic distortion, called spherical 
aberration, which must have originated in the primary mirror, the secondary 
mirror, or both. Continued analysis of images transmitted from the telescope 
indicated that most, if not all, of the problem lay in the primary mirror. 
The Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement (COSTAR) was 
subsequently developed to counter the effects of the flawed shape of the mirror. 
COSTAR was a telephone booth-sized instrument which placed 5 pairs of 
corrective mirrors, some as small as a nickel coin, in front of the Faint Object 
Camera, the Faint Object Spectrograph and the Goddard High Resolution 
Spectrograph. COSTAR was successfully installed on the first HST Servicing 
Mission, and HST has since functioned nominally. 
3.2.2 Failure Cause 
Investigation of the manufacture of the mirror proved that the mirror was made in 
the wrong shape, being too much flattened away from the mirror's center. During 
the manufacture of all telescope mirrors there are many repetitive cycles in which 
the surface is tested by reflecting light from it; the surface is then selectively 
polished to correct any errors in its shape. The error in the HST primary mirror 
occurred because the optical test used in this process was not set up correctly, 
and thus the surface was polished into the wrong shape. 
The critical optics used as a template in shaping the mirror, the reflective null 
corrector (RNC), consisted of two small mirrors and a lens. When, during the 
course of the failure investigation, the RNC was measured, it was determined 
that the lens was incorrectly spaced from the mirrors. Calculations of the effect 
of such displacement on the primary mirror show that the measured amount, 1.3 
mm, accounted in detail for the amount and character of the observed image 
blurring. [4] 
3.2.3 Systems Engineering Process Deficiencies 
Project Assessment -- Clear indications of a problem in the HST optics were 
evident from auxiliary optical tests made at the time. A special optical unit called 
an inverse null corrector, designed to mimic the reflection from a perfect primary 
mirror, was built and used to align the RNC; when so used, it clearly showed the 
error in the RNC. A second null corrector, made only with lenses, was used to 
measure the vertex radius of the finished primary mirror. It clearly showed the 
error in the primary mirror. Both indicators of error were dismissed at the time. 
Implementation - the HST primary mirror, as manufactured, was optically not 
within specification. The error was ten times larger than the specified tolerance. 
Verification -- No verification of the reflective null corrector's dimensions was 
carried out by Perkin-Elmer after the original assembly. No integrated test of the 
HST optics was performed, which would have detected the spherical aberration 
in the primary mirror. 
3.3 Mars Observer 
3.3.1 System Failure Scenario 
Mars Observer was launched from the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station on 25 
September 1992. The eleven month cruise phase from Earth to Mars was 
relatively trouble-free, with only a few anomalies noted, all of which were 
corrected. The first of a series of maneuvers designed to insert the spacecraft 
into an orbit around Mars had been planned to take place on 24 August 1993. 
The sequence of events leading to the first maneuver began as scheduled on 21 
August. The first action in this sequence involved pressurization of the propulsion 
system, initiated and controlled by a sequence of software commands previously 
stored in the spacecraft computers. In accordance with the mission’s published 
flight rules, the transmitter on the spacecraft had been turned off during the 
propellant-tank Pressurization Sequence on 21 August; as a result, there was no 
telemetry during this event. No data from the spacecraft have been received 
since that time. 
3.3.2 Failure Cause 
Despite extensive analysis of the circumstances surrounding the mission failure 
of the Mars Observer spacecraft, clear and conclusive evidence pointing to a 
particular scenario was not discovered. The most probable cause of the loss of 
downlink from the Mars Observer was a massive failure of the pressurization side 
of the propulsion system. The most probable cause of that failure was the 
unintended mixing of nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) and monomethyl hydrazine (MMH) 
in the titanium tubing on the pressurization side of the propulsion system. This 
mixing was believed to have been enabled by significant NTO migration through 
check valves during the eleven-month cruise phase from Earth to Mars. [5] 
3.3.3 Systems Engineering Process Deficiencies 
Project Planning -- The system failed to react properly to a program that 
changed radically from the program that was originally envisioned. The Mars 
Observer that was built departed significantly from the guiding principles 
originally established for the program, yet the acquisition and management 
strategy remained unchanged. The use of a firm, fixed-price contract was 
inappropriate to the effort as it finally evolved. 
Information Management -- The discipline and documentation culture 
associated with, and appropriate for, commercial production-line spacecraft is 
basically incompatible with the discipline and documentation required for a one- 
of-a-kind spacecraft designed for a complex mission. Mars Observer was not a 
production-line spacecraft. 
Architecture Design -- Too much reliance was placed on the heritage of 
spacecraft hardware, software, and procedures, especially since the Mars 
Observer mission was fundamentally different from the missions of the satellites 
from which the heritage was derived. The design of the propulsion system was 
not appropriate for the long duration dormancy required. 
Implementation -- The use of a fault-management software package that was 
not fully understood. 
Verification -- The original philosophy of minor modifications to a commercial 
production-line spacecraft was retained throughout the program. The result was 
reliance on design and component heritage qualification that was inappropriate 
for the mission. Examples of this reliance include the failure to qualify the 
traveling wave tube amplifiers for pyrotechnic firing shock. 
3.4 Wide-field Infrared Explorer (WIRE) 
3.4.1 System Failure Scenario 
The WIRE spacecraft was a planned four-month survey in the 12 and 25 pm 
infrared color bands. It was launched on 4 March 1999, and a problem was 
detected during its second pass over the ground station. The spacecraft was 
spinning and did not maintain a stable position. The instrument cover had been 
ejected at approximately the time that the WIRE Pyro Box was powered on. As a 
result, the instrument's solid hydrogen cryogen supply started to sublimate faster 
than planned, and the venting of the resulting effluent caused the spacecraft to 
spin up. The spacecraft reached a spin rate of sixty revolutions per minute 
before being brought under control. Because of the loss of solid hydrogen 
cryogen, the instrument could not perform its scientific observations, and the 
mission was declared a total loss. 
3.4.2 Failure Cause 
The cause of the failure was a digital logic error in the instrument pyrotechnic 
control electronics. The variable turn-on characteristics of the Field 
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) used in the pyrotechnic control circuitry were 
not adequately considered in the electronics design. The FPGA application for 
the WIRE instrument did not account for the finite time it takes the FPGA to ramp 
up at turn-on and establish a stable configuration. That ramp-up time is 
proportional to the elapsed time since the device was last powered down, as 
capacitors internal to the FPGA dissipate their charge over time. During 
integration and testing, the system was energized every day, so the FPGA 
internal capacitance never had a chance to fully dissipate. Prior to launch, this 
part of the satellite circuitry had been powered off for about two weeks. [6] 
3.4.3 Systems Engineering Process Deficiencies 
Project Assessment -- A significant contributing factor which should have been 
able to prevent the WIRE mishap was the failure to investigate the source of the 
signal which caused the Electro Explosive Device (EED) Simulator to "latch" 
upon Pyro Box power-up during spacecraft integration. The incident was 
incorrectly attributed to excessive sensitivity of the EED Simulator and then an 
incorrect argument of similarity to other pyrotechnic device driver electronics was 
made; in fact it probably was an indication of the transient that caused the in- 
flight mishap. 
-- A contributing factor to the mishap was the lack of 
documentation for the Actel A? 020 FPGA's power-up transient characteristics in 
the device data sheet. This information was available in the FPGA Data Book 
and Design Guide in two application notes. Likewise, the lack of documentation 
for the Vectron 200 kHz oscillator's start time in the device data sheet was also a 
contributing factor. 
Architecture Design -- The cause of the WIRE mishap was logic design error. 
The transient performance of components was not adequately accounted for in 
the design. The failure was caused by two distinct mechanisms that, either singly 
or in concert, resulted in inadvertent pyrotechnic device firing during the initial 
Pyro Box power-up. The control logic design utilized a synchronous reset to force 
the logic into a safe state. However, the start-up time of the crystal clock 
oscillator was not taken into consideration, leaving the circuit in a non- 
deterministic state for a significant period of time. Likewise, the startup 
characteristics of the FPGA were not considered. These devices are not 
guaranteed to follow their "truth table" until an internal charge pump "starts" the 
part and the uncontrolled outputs were not blocked from the pyrotechnic devices' 
driver circuitry. 
Verification -- There was no system level end-to-end test with live pyrotechnic 
devices. The absence of this test coupled with the low fidelity simulators may be 
considered a contributing factor to the mishap. There has been no evidence of 
any component failure. Another contributing factor to the mishap was the lack of 
fidelity of the Electro Explosive Device (EED) Simulator. This device does not 
accurately simulate a pyrotechnic device used in the WIRE instrument. This 
possibly prevented a large current transient from being registered on the power 
input lines during spacecraft test. Additionally, the EED Simulator does not 
provide adequate information about all input signals capable of firing a 
pyrotechnic device. 
3.5 Genesis 
3.5.1 System Failure Scenario 
Genesis was one of NASA's Discovery missions, and its purpose was to collect 
samples of solar wind and return them to Earth. Launched on 8 August 2001, 
Genesis was to provide fundamental data to help scientists understand the 
formation of our solar system. Analysis of solar materials collected and returned 
to Earth would give precise data on the chemical and isotopic composition of the 
solar wind. On September 8,2004 the Genesis sample return capsule drogue 
parachute did not deploy during entry, descent, and landing operations over the 
Utah Test and Training Range. The drogue parachute was intended to slow the 
capsule and provide stability during transonic flight. After the point of expected 
drogue deployment, the sample return capsule began to tumble and impacted 
the Test Range, at which point vehicle safing and recovery operations began. 
The mishap cause was the G-switch sensors, which were in an inverted 
orientation per an erroneous design, and were unable to sense sample return 
capsule deceleration during atmospheric entry and initiate parachute 
deployments. [7] 
3.5.4 Systems Engineering Process Deficiencies 
Project Planning -- A lack of involvement by NASA and Systems Engineering in 
vendor spacecraft activities led to insufficient critical oversight that might have 
identified the key process errors that occurred at the vendor during the design, 
review, and test of the spacecraft. However, this process was consistent with the 
Faster, Better, Cheaper philosophy of the time and approved of by the Discovery 
Program. 
Project Assessment -- All levels of review, including the Genesis Red Team 
review, failed to detect the design or verification errors. 
Architecture Design - The Genesis project team made a number of errors 
because of their belief that the G-switch sensor circuitry was a heritage design. 
Further, the prevalent view that heritage designs required less scrutiny and were 
inherently more reliable than new designs led to the mishap. 
Verification -- Several issues led to the lack of proper testing of the G-switch 
sensors, including a failure to treat the G-switches as sensors, which ultimately 
led to the mishap. The Investigation Board recommended review and verification 
of heritage designs to the same level expected of new hardware/software. 
3.2.6 Lewis 
The Lewis spacecraft was launched on 23 August 1997, with the goal of 
demonstrating advanced science instruments and spacecraft technologies for 
measuring changes in Earth's land surfaces. The spacecraft entered a flat spin in 
orbit that resulted in a loss of solar power and a fatal battery discharge. Contact 
with the spacecraft was lost on 26 August, and it then re- entered the 
atmosphere and was destroyed on 28 September. 
ai a m  
inor rotational perturbations, possi ly due to small imbalances in the forces 
produced by the spacecraft's attitud control thrusters, caused the Le 
spacecraft to enter a spin. Subsequent excessive thruster firings, caused by the 
spacecraft autonomous attempts to control in the intermediate axis mode, were 
sensed by the spacecraft processor which then disabled the A-side thrusters and 
had switched control from A-side processor to B-side processor. Excessive 
thruster firings on the B-side then caused the B-side thrusters to also be disabled 
by the processor, leaving the spacecraft uncontrolled. The single two-axis gyro 
was saturated, and the spacecraft was then in free drift that resulted in rotation 
about the principal axis, off pointing the solar array from the Sun and leaving the 
spacecraft without the ability to recharge its batteries. This sequence of errors, 
combined with the assumption that a small crew could monitor and operate Lewis 
with the aid of an autonomous safehold mode, even during the initial operations 
period, was the primary causes of the mission failure. [8] 
3.6.3 Systems ngineer~ng Process 
Requirements Analysis -- The requirements were driven by the 
accommodations needed for the scientific payload that included the first 
spaceflight version of a hyperspectral imager. The spacecraft subsystems, for the 
most part, had challenging performance requirements, in such areas as pointing 
accuracy and thermal control, resulting in a relatively complex design. 
Architecture Design -- The control system design was based on a TOMS 
heritage design, and was analyzed using tools developed for the TOMS program 
in spite of significant differences that existed between the TOMS and Lewis 
configurations and requirement sets. The Lewis control subsystem design was 
more complex than TOMS. Lewis aligned its intermediatehnstable axis of inertia 
toward the sun while TOMS pointed it principaktable axis of inertia toward the 
sun in safe mode. TOMS measured rates in 3 axes, while rate information about 
the intermediate axis was deemed unnecessary for Lewis. Additionally, time out 
logic was used to disable the Lewis thruster electronics whenever the processor 
detected an "excessive" string of thruster firings, a feature was included to 
preclude an inadvertent vehicle spin-up and to preserve fuel. 
Verification -- The simulation that was used to validate the ACS Safe Mode was 
flawed. The ACS design heritage was initially based on the proven Total Ozone 
Mapping Spacecraft (TOMS) design. The expected system performance was 
then analyzed using tools developed for the TOMS program. In fact, the Lewis 
control subsystem design was significantly more complex than TOMS because 
the Lewis spacecraft aligned its x-axis (intermediatehnstable), rather than its z- 
axis (principalktable) of inertia toward the sun in Safe Mode. When a Lewis 
design modified version of the TOMS simulation was run, neither a thruster 
imbalance nor an initial (albeit small) spin rate about the intermediate (roll) axis 
was modeled. An additional factor was that the simulation was done using 
mission mode parameters, not low earth transfer mode parameters that 
represented the condition that the spacecraft was actually in at the time of these 
operations. The mission mode represented a more stable attitude control 
condition because of lower drag forces. 
Transition -- The flat spin began in low earth transfer mode before mission mode 
was achieved. It occurred in a period when the ground stations were available 
but the operations crew had not yet returned to work and therefore went initially 
unnoticed. By the time of the discovery of the anomaly, the battery was in a 
deep depth of discharge (approximately 72%). At the next and final contact pass 
(in this low earth orbit the ground station contact times are on the order of about 
five minutes each), the depth of battery discharge was 82%. In preparing for this 
pass, the operations crew working under extreme time pressure developed a 
recovery plan. At the start of the contact pass the B-side thrusters were enabled 
by ground command, and three, one-second thruster pulses were commanded in 
an attempt to arrest the spacecraft rotation rate. As it turns out only the first of the 
three commands was executed by the dying spacecraft because the operations 
crew had addressed the second and third commands incorrectly. The spacecraft 
went out of ground station contact and was subsequently never reacquired. 
3.7 Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) 
3.7.1 System Failure Scenario 
On 15 April 2005, the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology 
(DART) Spacecraft was successfully deployed from a Pegasus XL rocket 
launched from the Western Test Range at Vandenberg Air Force Base, 
California. The intent of DART was to demonstrate that a pre-programmed and 
unaided spacecraft could independently rendezvous or meet up with a non- 
maneuvering and cooperating satellite. The MUBLCOM satellite was DART's 
rendezvous target. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency had 
deployed MUBLCOM in 1999, and it remained in orbit in good operational 
condition following completion of its original and primary mission. During the 
DART mission, all went as expected throughout the launch and early orbit 
phases. The vehicle successfully completed its rendezvous phase as well, 
placing itself into a second staging orbit about 40 kilometers behind and 7.5 
kilometers below MUBLCOM, even though ground operators began to notice an 
irregularity with the navigation system. Less than 11 hours into the mission, 
DART collided with MUBLCOM. MUBLCOM did not appear to experience 
significant damage, and the impact actually pushed it into a higher orbit. 
Subsequently, DART'S departure and retirement phase proceeded per the 
original plan, and MUBLCOM regained its operational status after an automatic 
system reset that resulted from the collision. 
3.7.2 Failure Cause 
The 
System (GPS)-based sensors to determine position and velocity relative to 
MUBLCOM, and when in close proximity to the MUBLCOM, the Advanced Video 
Guidance Sensor (AVGS) to collect precise navigational data. As DART 
approached MUBLCOM, it overshot an important waypoint, or position in space, 
that would have triggered the transition to close proximity operations. Because it 
missed this critical waypoint, the AVGS was never activated to supply DART's 
navigation system with accurate measurements of the range to MUBLCOM. 
Consequently, DART continued to steer towards MUBLCOM on the basis of the 
GPS-based navigational data, but it was not able to accurately determine its 
distance to MUBLCOM. DART's collision avoidance system eventually activated 
1 minute and 23 seconds before the collision, but the inaccurate perception of its 
distance and speed in relation to MUBLCOM prevented DART from taking 
effective action to avoid a collision. [9] 
navigational system used two types of sensors - Global Positioning 
3.7.3 Systems Engineering Process Deficiencies 
Requirements Analysis -- DART was not designed to receive commands from 
the ground, an approach considered philosophically consistent with the objective 
that DART be a demonstration of autonomous technology. However, this 
indirectly led to mission failure as the ground operators were unable to take 
corrective action when they noticed the irregularities in the navigation system - 
they could only sit and watch events unfold. 
Architecture Design -- In DART's case, the vendor carried over many of 
DART's design features from the Pegasus launch vehicle approach. For 
example, the software architecture, which consisted primarily of a pre- 
programmed, timed sequence of fixed commands, worked adequately for a 
launch vehicle, but was not able to respond adaptively while performing 
autonomous in-space operations with unanticipated inputs. 
4. Discussion 
A summary of the systems engineering process deficiencies identified in the 
preceding section is shown in Figure 3. For the seven system failures reviewed, 
it is observed that deficiencies were observed in 8 of the 18 Project and 
Technical processes. Of these, three processes were dominant: 
0 Project Assessment (4 deficiencies) 
0 Architecture Design (6 deficiencies) 
0 Verification (6 deficiencies) 
The remaining five processes had only one or two deficiencies identified. In the 
case of Project Assessment deficiencies, two deficiencies dealt with failure to 
address discrepancies that arose during testing that would have identified the 
causal factor of the eventual system failure, and the other two deficiencies 
pertained to failure to thoroughly analyze a portion of the design owing to its 
presumed heritage. It is noted that two of these instances pertain to Architecture 
Design, and the other two pertain to Verification. In the case of the deficiencies 
in Architecture Design, five of the six identified deficiencies were associated with 
inadequate rigor applied to the design and analysis of elements of the 
architecture that utilized heritage hardware and software; the other deficiency 
was a failure to sufficiently analyze power-up transient behavior of control 
electronics. In the case of Verification deficiencies, five of the six identified 
deficiencies were associated with the utilization of heritage hardware and 
software; the heritage of these architectural elements led to decisions to verify 
configurations that differed from the flight configuration, to verify to parameters 
that differed from the flight parameter values. The other Verification deficiency 
was attributable to a failure to verify a critical item of Ground Support Equipment 
that was being used in the flight system verification. 
Figure 3. Summary of Observed Systems Engineering Process Deficiencies 
The foregoing analysis suggests the following general observations: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
The utilization of heritage hardware and software in a project, while 
perceived to reduce development risk due to its heritage, introduces risks 
that will manifest themselves as deficiencies in the Architecture Design 
and Verification processes. 
The Project Assessment process must be acutely aware of addressing 
discrepancies during testing, as these may be harbingers of things to 
come. Likewise, the process must resist temptation to lessen design and 
analysis rigor when dealing with heritage hardware and software. 
The systemic recurrence of specific systems engineering process 
deficiencies associated with the utilization of heritage hardware and 
re suggests a weakness of nterprise Processes, the Quality 
anagement process in particular. 
For this study, a sampling of seven space system failures was assessed - one 
launch vehicle and six spacecraft of varying scales, developed and launched 
over a span of two decades, which encountered a variety of failures. One 
recurrent theme in the system failures was problems associated with utilization of 
heritage hardware. Whether this is an artifact of a small sample or a valid 
conclusion is not clear at this time, and suggests the need for a more 
comprehensive study of this phenomena. 
However, even given the small sampling of projects assessed in this study, it can 
be concluded that a lack of rigor in execution of systems engineering processes 
is a contributing factor to the cited instances of space systems failures. Since all 
the system failures studies were mission performance failures, it should not come 
as a surprise that the systems engineering processes dealing with design and 
test were revealed to be deficient most frequently. These were projects that, 
after all, had survived the “infant mortality” phase of space systems, the concept 
and early development phases when so many space systems are cancelled due 
to spiraling cost estimates or the inability to form a cohesive and stable 
stakeholder base. Had a sampling of “programmatic” failures been included, 
doubtless the composition of systems engineering process deficiencies would 
have changed - but that is a subject for another paper. 
As a footnote, it is noteworthy that although in each case discussed in this paper 
the original mission was a complete failure, in three cases the persistence and 
ingenuity of the project team allowed eventual mission success. For instance, 
despite failure in its maiden flight, the Ariane 5 is now flying successfully. A 
repair mission corrected the flawed optics on the Hubble Space Telescope, and it 
has since been performing magnificently. And although the Wide-field Infrared 
Explorer (WIRE) spacecraft planned scientific mission was a failure, the WIRE 
spacecraft was recovered by the mission controllers and completed a number of 
asteroseismology investigations for NASA’s Office of Space Science as well as 
acting as a technology test bed for several advanced technology projects. 
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